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INTRODUCTION

This Article is about carrying out informal instructions given by

people in authority. Although many scholars have written about how
t University Professor, Columbia University. I have benefitted greatly from discussions and criticisms in 1995 and 1996 Seminars in Legal Interpretation, Faculty Workshops
at Columbia Law School and the University of Utah Department of Philosophy, and at the
Comell Law Review Symposium from which this issue of the Law Review derives. Among the
individuals who gave me very helpful comments are Akeel Bilgrami, Edward Blatnik,
Anthony Dillof, Alfred Hill, Paul Horwitz, Mark Hulbert, Joseph Raz, Carol Sanger, Adrienne Stone, Stephen Sugarman, Robert Summers, and William Young. Stephen Garvey's
written response raises difficult questions and illuminates important problems.
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legal interpretation resembles interpretation in fields such as literature and religion, few have compared informal instructions and legal
rules.' My most basic assumption in this Article is that focus on informal situations can illumine the standards people use in performing
instructions and the kinds of meaning they attribute to instructions.
As my title implies, if we reflect on what amounts to faithful or desirable performance of informal directives and the more conceptual question of what these prescriptive standards "mean," we can learn
something about how to understand ordinary language in law, about
the possible legal relevance of the intent of those who issue directions,
and about how people should respond to legal directives.
Because legislation, executive orders, and wills may be conceived
as directives about what people should do, informal illustrations may
have a bearing on understanding these parts of the law. Aspects of
the illustrations may also have relevance for contracts, constitutional
interpretation, and common law adjudication. Of course, no move
from simple, personal examples to most legal ones will be easy. One
critical obstacle involves the complexities of multi-member bodies.
Another concerns the characteristics of legal systems, including what
Robert Summers calls its formal aspects2 and the tripartite relations

between people who formulate legal norms, those directly subject to
the norms, and the agencies responsible for enforcing the norms.
In subsequent work, I plan to concentrate on the transition from
simple nonlegal to complicated legal instructions. Because a legal system differs in fundamental ways from informal relationships, we
should not expect conclusions about simple instructions to emerge
miraculously intact after ingenious analysis. For example, even if intent matters a great deal for performing informal instructions, it may
have no appropriate role in judicial interpretation of legislation.
Although I leave all such arguments for another day, I nonetheless
claim that examination of simple instructions sheds significant light
on issues about law. Most fundamentally, it helps us to distinguish
between problems about interpretation of language that are generic
to authoritative prescriptions and problems that are particular to all
or some legal systems. Further, once we see how difficult it is to
I

For perceptive, modem treatments of rules in general, see JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL
(1975); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991). I use a different
sense of "instruction" than the kind of nonmandatory recipes or advice discussed by
Schauer. Id at 3-4. In some respects, my discussion resembles Wittgenstein's sustained, if
not systematic, examination of informal rules in LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS §§ 138-242 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Macmillan Publishing Co. 1958). On
the nature of imperatives, see C.L. HUMBUIN, IMPERATIVES (1975).
2 Robert S. Summers, How Law Is Formaland Why It Matters, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1165
REASON AND NoRms
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choose any single standard to measure the desirable performance of
instructions, how difficult it is to adopt a standpoint to determine
meaning, and how difficult it is to perceive a complete fit between
meaning and desirable performance, we will doubt that matters will
be more straightforward when we turn to law. It is conceivable that
the relative formality of law will allow more definite conclusions for
some matters than may be reached for informal instructions, but we
should expect many of the problematic aspects of desirable performance and meaning to carry over to a consideration of law.
Insofar as further analysis suggests that aspects of law are similar
to informal instructions, study of such instructions allows us some degree of detachment from hotly contested issues in legal philosophy,
from favored political positions, and from our approval or disapproval
of particular judges. Insofar as further analysis indicates that aspects
of law are crucially dissimilar from informal instructions, this study
can help reveal what is special about law. I do not develop the comparisons with law here, but I hope that what I present, even standing
alone, is suggestive in that respect.
It may clarify what follows if I say a few words about my methodology. For various kinds of circumstances, I inquire about the performance and meaning of instructions. About most questions of
performance and how people understand instructions, I adopt the
perspectives of people involved and ask how they would see things
after some reflection. In my theoretical analysis, I do not begin with
any overarching view about performance or meaning, or about the
relation between performance and meaning. One could approach
things differently, beginning with a systematic theory about performance or meaning, or both, and then seeing how the "data" fit. Alternatively, one could move from reflective intuitions to build some
systematic theory. My discussion here does not provide any conclusive
arguments against systematic theories about performance or meaning,
but it reflects my skepticism about such theories for informal
instructions.
With regard to performance, I urge that one cannot reduce the
ideal performance of instructions to any single criterion, such as the
intent of the person issuing them, a reasonable person's understanding of what the instructions convey, or the bestjudgment of the recipient about what to do. I discuss various kinds of situations, which I can
summarize as (1) instructions whose import is clear in context; (2)
instructions that are unclear in context because of incompleteness,
vagueness, ambiguity, or a possible slip; (3) instructions whose application is affected by changing conditions. These changing conditions
may lead a recipient to continue to carry out instructions (though not
each of their terms), or to fulfill the spirit of the instructions (though
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not their terms), or to regard the instructions as losing force. As I
develop my examples, I attempt to indicate the variables that may figure in decisions about performance. My conclusion is that a number
of standards affect desirable performance, and only by examination
and argument about specific contexts, can one decide how much
these factors should count. If this amounts to a general theory at all,
it is so vague as to be vacuous.
A proposal that, at least for informal instructions, meaning can be
summed up in some straightforward formula, such as literal meaning,
or ordinary meaning, or speaker's intent, has more plausibility than a
parallel approach to performance. According to such proposals,
meaning is meaning, everything else that figures in proper performance is something other than meaning. Proposals of this kind cannot
be defeated by conclusions that various factors affect proper performance, but they run up against intuitions about the heterodoxy of
meaning. For example, when a speaker's intent is crucial for performance, one's tendency is to tie meaning more closely to speaker's intent
than when that intent matters less for desirable performance. One
could generally tie meaning very closely to desirable performance-to
say that what instructions mean in context depends on how they
should best be carried out. Indeed, that is the tendency in law; courts
may say that statutes really mean what is determined to be their best
application. Yet, tying meaning too closely to performance is awkward. As we shall see, proper performance often turns on issues of
authority that are not well captured as debates about meaning. 3 My
tentative conclusion is that we should perhaps not try to settle on any
single sense of meaning, whether that sense is stated as a standard
separate from performance or linked tightly to proper performance.
After some clarifying remarks about the characteristics of my examples, my crucial terms, and my general approach, I discuss instructions whose application is specific and clear. I then examine, in turn,
instructions that are incomplete, vague, or ambiguous and instructions that guide behavior in changing conditions.

3 However, one can say that the meaning of a specific instruction in context depends
on wider interpretations of the respective authority of the speaker and recipient. Thus, the
specific instruction's meaning could depend on more general instructions or deeper understandings about authority.
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I
NONLEGAL INSTRUcTIONS-THE BASIC SE=TTNGS,
PossIBLrrIEs CONCERNING COMPLIANCE,
FAITHFuL PERFORMANCE, AND
MEANING

The examples I discuss have the following general characteristics:
instructions are issued to a definite person or class of persons. The
person issuing the instructions has authority to prescribe what the person following the instructions should do. 4 Correlatively, the person
receiving the instructions has some duty or obligation to follow them.
Usually the recipient is subordinate to the person giving the instructions, but I include (as recipients) professionals with duties to carry
out instructions of clients. The recipient not only understands the
instructions, but also is capable of perceiving their objectives to some
degree and of exercising somejudgment about their subject.5 Among
the situations that fit this pattern are instructions given by: parents to
nannies, employers to employees, officers to soldiers, directors to
dancers and actors, coaches to athletes, and clients to lawyers. Another typical (though not universal) feature of these instructions is
that the recipient's response may be reviewed. As with coaches or theater directors, the instructors directly oversee performance, or they
assess performance after the fact.
A recipient can either follow instructions or disobey them. Sometimes she can depart from instructions without disobeying them. Suppose a coach tells her basketball team: "You are three points ahead,
and there are twenty-four seconds left in the game. Don't shoot; run
out the clock." If the players pass and dribble the ball without shooting, they have obeyed instructions. If a player takes a shot of ordinary
difficulty, she has disobeyed the coach. 6 What if Cheryl, unguarded,
receives the ball under the basket with the opportunity to take a shot
that she nearly always makes, and she shoots, believing that the nearly
certain basket will help assure the team's victory? If Cheryl understands that the coach really meant that no one should take any shot,
however easy, she has disobeyed the instructions; but if Cheryl reasonably and correctly perceives that the coach was not referring to such
easy shots, we may say she has departed from the instructions (in the
sense of no longer carrying them out) without disobeying them.
4

1 assume that the person in authority is exercising his authority in a proper range.

For example, the director of a play is not deliberately trying to stage an unsuccessful production in order to take revenge on its main financial backer.
5 Thus, I do not include a very small child who may understand that he has been told
never to cross the road, or talk to strangers, without comprehending why that is so.
6 Or, she may have forgotten the instructions in the heat of the moment.

1997]

FROM THE BOTTOM UP

Could we say that the instructions were actually carried out? I do
not think so. Cheryl did what any player would ordinarily do-she
took a very easy shot. The coach's instructions to avoid shooting do
not add to her reasons to do that. It is as if, at most, the coach had not
7
addressed this particular situation.
Beyond the question of whether a recipient has complied with an
instruction, lies the further question of whether compliance, or noncompliance, is justified. The answer to this question of justification
calls for an evaluation that reaches outside the import of the instruction. Thus, Cheryl might say, "I knew you meant we should not take
any shots at all, but I was sure I would make this one and that it would
help the team win. So I went ahead." Cheryl's attempt to justify diso8
bedience rests on the same basic objective underlying the instruction.
On other occasions, a person relies on some external objective or
value to support her disobedience. 9
My initial examination of instructions concerns what would constitute "faithful" performance. Among the important variables are:
(1) the specificity of the language as applied to the choice involved;
(2) the extent to which the conditions have changed since the instructions were issued; and (3) the relationship between the issuer of the
instructions and the recipient. Even for simple instructions, common
and desirable strategies of performance do not reduce to a single
consideration. 10
The words "faithful performance" are not meant to imply by their
terms that the recipient of the instructions should necessarily carry
out "the will" of the speaker. Indeed, this is not always what the recipient should do. Phrases such as "desirable performance" or "best performance" might better avoid any implication that everything reduces
to the wishes of the person in authority, but those terms present other
7 It is possible that on past occasions the coach had made clear that whenever she
says, "Don't shoot," she means "Don't shoot, except when you have a very easy shot, which
you should take." In that event, the coach has spoken to the situation, and taking the shot
does carry out the instructions.
In the Appendix, I attempt to classify with more precision the situations in which a
person self-consciously does not follow instructions.
8 The "objective" may be put at different levels. If the objective is "winning the
game" or "making sure we don't lose the ball without scoring," Cheryl tried to achieve the
objective. If the objective is "keeping the ball from the other team as long as possible," she
has not tried to achieve it.
9 Exactly which values will count as external will often depend on how narrowly or
broadly one puts the objective of the instructions. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 49
n.13 (discussing problems inherent in even as simple a rule as a restaurant's "No dogs
allowed"); see also M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragnaticsin Statutory
Interpretation,46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 373, 388-89 (1985) (noting the existence of a hierarchy of
ever-widening purposes).
10 Perhaps more precisely, they do not reduce to a single consideration narrow
enough to be meaningful.
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difficulties. One can render a performance that happens to be desirable, though one's motives have nothing to do with carrying out the
instructions or fulfilling one's role. I want to signal the idea that the
recipient of instructions does respect the authority of the speaker and
is trying to be faithful to his own role as the recipient of authoritative
instructions.
In this Article, I offer suggestions about what constitutes faithful
performance in various settings. My aim is to capture elements of situations that readers will find significant; but I do not offer systematic
defenses of why doing one thing is faithful performance and doing
something else is not. My main objectives will hardly be affected if
readers disagree substantially with me over what recipients should do
in particular instances. My crucial point is that figuring out what recipients should do is often complicated and debatable. Readers need
not agree with my specific opinions about performance to grasp that
point.
Lest the term "faithful performance" imply a single action that
complies with instructions, I note that more than one action may be
"faithful." Instructions may leave a range of possibilities available.
Moreover, the standard that a recipient of instructions uses to guide
his actions may be different from the standard someone else uses to
evaluate the recipient's actions.
Inquiries about performance reveal perplexing questions about
"meaning." The precise relation between the "meaning" of an instruction and the best efforts to carry out the instruction turns out to be
anything but obvious. Perhaps we should recognize that "meaning" is
essentially a practical concept. Meaning may vary depending on the
kind of activity that is involved, and the same instruction may be conceived as having different meanings at different stages. Whether we
can speak usefully about "the meaning" of even one instruction at a
single point in time is doubtful. I do not suggest that one cannot
answer specific questions about what the speaker meant, or about how
most people would understand the instruction, or about how the instruction would best be understood. The doubt is whether any of
these, or anything else, may comfortably be called "the meaning."
In my consideration of "meaning," I write, "we would say," "we
might say," or "we would probably say." I do not begin with any rigorous scheme of categorization that generates how we should speak of
various situations. Rather, I attempt to depict how an ordinary
speaker of the language would speak when he or she is being very
careful (and perhaps after being presented with various alternatives).
One reason why reaching conclusions is difficult is that English (and
other natural languages) lack precise forms to mark many subtle dis-
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tinctions." The efforts to decide between conceptual possibilities
help to reveal those distinctions.
My choice to proceed from performance to meaning, rather than
in the opposite direction, needs some explanation. One might begin
with an account of "meaning"-for example, that meaning is determined by the intent of the speaker-and see how well that accords
with what is appropriate performance. One would learn fairly quickly
that no single straightforward account of "meaning" could cover
everything that a recipient of instructions should take into account.
One might, nonetheless, stick to a single version of meaning, conclude that meaning is only one component of practical choice by
those subject to instructions, and comment on what besides meaning
is involved. Nothing in this Article indicates that this is an impossible
way to proceed.
For those whose primary concern is practical choice, however,
the order proceeding from performance to meaning seems more
promising. Lawyers, at least, are inclined to suppose that legal norms
should be observed and applied according to their meaning. They
see the significance of "meaning" as largely practical. What I do, is to
test the sense that "meaning" should accord with "faithful performance" with respect to informal illustrations. In a systematic account,
one would need to compare all plausible candidates for "meaning"
against all plausible versions of "faithful performance," before one
tried to reach any final conclusions about the "meaning" of instructions (or legal norms). One would need to decide how great a gap
was acceptable between "meaning" and "faithful performance" in various settings, ,and whether one should strive for a single sense of
"meaning." In my less-than-systematic account, I have employed the
order of presentation that seems most fruitful, but I do not claim that
12
there is any necessary logical priority of performance over meaning.
11
As Michael Moore notes, J.L. Austin talked of fact being "richer than diction."
Michael S. Moore, The Semantics ofJudging,54 S. GAL. L. REv. 151, 292 (1981) (quofingJ.L.
Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ArusTOTELIAN SocIETY 1, 21 (1957)).
Under Moore's "realist" approach to language, the meaning of words and phrases embraces the best understanding of concepts. However, it is still true that at any point in
time, our language does not dearly mark many subtle distinctions.
12 One criticism that might be mounted against my observations about both "faithful
performance" and "meaning" is that a full account of either requires reference to an interpretive methodology. Yet, I have not provided one. The critic would be right that recipients of instructions often employ (at least implicitly) strategies of interpretation; and that a
final assessment of these matters involves measuring tentative judgments about performance and meaning against possible approaches to interpretation. My discussion proceeds
on the assumption that much can be said about the performance and meaning of informal
instructions without either conceptualizing common practice in terms of a theory of interpretation or recommending a particular interpretive theory for use. Indeed, illustrations
of the sort I consider can help provide the building blocks for descriptive and normative
theories of interpretation.
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II
How TO INTERPRET INSTRUCTIONS

I attended a conference of linguists and legal scholars, at which
William Eskridge presented an embellished version of an old illustration that raised fascinating issues of interpretation. We can learn a
good deal by teasing out its implications. Professor Eskridge said:
Here's the hypothetical I want to set forth. It's based upon
Francis Lieber's book.... Georgia is the head of a household.
Kent is her housekeeper, basically. Georgia ... has several children.
Among the many directives she says to Kent is this: "Kent, I'm going
away for a while. Here is a laundry list of things you have to do.
First and foremost, I want you to fetch soupmeat every Monday
from Store X."
The directive to Kent might require some degree of interpretation. But perhaps very little, because there might have been much
fetching of soupmeat before Georgia's departure. Kent knows from
earlier interactions with Georgia that this soupmeat has a fairly narrow range of connotations. Store X is a store that's about five or six
blocks down the street .... So for the first several Mondays, what
Kent does is precisely what Georgia expect[s] him to do. Kent trots
on down . . . into Store X, and there is a counter that says
"Soupmeat." It's where he's always bought it, and he buys the
soupmeat. Some kind of beef, let's say.... The longer Georgia is
gone away, the more likely it is that the directive's interpretation
will change. Several weeks later, Kent trots down to the area, and
Store X has burned down. So, he goes to Store Y. Now he in some
ways has violated the literal terms of the directive, because he is
fetching soupmeat from Store Y. But he can not get ahold of Georgia right in the middle of his errand, and it's not cost beneficial for
him to do so. He almost reflexively goes to Store Y...
Several months later, Kent ... received another directive from
Georgia in a letter saying Georgia has read that children with high
cholesterol rates have health difficulties later in life. She says, "I'm
very worried about this. From now on I want you to buy lots of
apples, bran and oranges, things that this article says are low in cholesterol because I think this will be good for the children."
Kent goes to Store Y. In casual conversation with Judith, the
butcher of Store Y, he learns.., that soupmeat is extremely high in
cholesterol. "Indeed," Judith says, "my Lord, this is the highest cholesterol rate in the entire store. You mightjust as well be mainlining
cholesterol into these children by feeding them soupmeat!" Kent
decides that he will now buy chicken for soup rather than cholesterol-filled soupmeat.
Some months later Kent trots down to Store Y intending to buy
chicken. Posted on the door of Store Y is a new rationing system
that the city has adopted because of exigent circumstances entailed
by war or famine or something like that. Under the rationing sys-
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tern, each family (and Kent is now the surrogate head of Georgia's
family), gets only so many rationing tickets, only so many economic
units to buy food. Based upon this rationing system, Kent decides
to forego buying meat at all, because he believes that meat is an
extravagance under this system and decides to buy other things that
3
will fill up the children's little stomachs.'
In this example, Kent is Georgia's housekeeper. Georgia definitely has the authority to tell him what to do. Some aspects of her
instructions are clear and precise, so long as ordinary conditions prevail. Kent is supposed to shop for soupmeat on Monday and he is to go
to Store X The word "soupmeat" itself seems to leave more latitude for
a range of choice than the other terms, but that range may have been
narrowed. If Store X sells only one kind of meat as "soupmeat," or if
Georgia and Kent had previously agreed that they will use a certain
kind of meat, Georgia's reference to soupmeat may indicate that spe14
cific kind of meat.
A.

Instructions That Are Specific in Context

When the language of instructions is straightforward in context
and the instructions are capable of being performed, the intentions of
the person giving the instructions will coincide with a recipient's reasonable understanding of the force of the instructions. The "meaning" of the instructions will fit the behavior of someone who faithfully
fulfills them. On many occasions, these conditions are satisfied, and
there is little doubt about proper performance or meaning.
Even when instructions are specific, however, complexities can
generate difficulty in determining what is the housekeeper's controlling guide, and these difficulties can sow seeds of uncertainty about
the equivalence of "meaning" with what constitutes "faithful
performance."
1.

Faithful Performance

Should Kent be guided by what a reasonable listener might conclude about the instructions, or by the subjective (mental state) intentions of Georgia? One point is obvious. Kent's faithful performance
of the instructions does not depend on how they would be understood by
a reasonable listener unaware of past dealings between Georgia and
Kent. If those past dealings yielded an understanding of "soupmeat"
13
Northwestern University/Washington University Law and Linguistics Conference,
Proceedings, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 800, 940-42 (1995) [hereinafter Proceedings] (footnotes omitted) (using story from FRANcis LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTics 28-29 (enlarged ed. 1839).

14 I assume for the time being that neither external conditions nor relevant knowledge has changed.
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narrower than the general concept of "soupmeat," faithful performance would include buying the meat Georgia had in mind. Were a
"reasonable listener" to be at all relevant for faithful performance, he
would be aware of any relations between Georgia and Kent that bear
on the instruction.
In these circumstances, one can hardly draw a line between performance that adopts the perspective of a fully informed listener and
performance that aims to follow Georgia's intentions. A reasonable
listener of this type will be confident he has assessed Georgia's intentions, and he will believe that Georgia has precisely framed her instructions to express her mental state about a highly specific matter.
She wants Kent to buy soupmeat on Monday at Store X she has given
her instructions to achieve that objective, and she intends her instructions to communicate to Kent that she wants him to behave in that
way and to understand that she has instructed him to do so. The reasonable listener will conclude that carrying out the instructions involves doing what Georgia wants (in a mental state sense). Kent's
attempt to comply with Georgia's mental state intentions will fit what a
reasonable listener would conclude about the instructions. 15
If Georgia's explicit applicable language differs from her intentions, analysis becomes more complicated. Other aspects of her instructions, their objectives, or their conditions of performance may
clearly signal that she has made a mistake. For example, unless the
household has an odd schedule, Kent will assume that when Georgia
writes "shop at 3:00 a.m.," she intends 3:00 p.m. (or conceivably, a
later morning hour). In such circumstances, faithful performance
and reasonable understanding deviate from the literal import of some
term.
More serious difficulties arise when the instructions themselves
do not signal that the writer has slipped. Suppose Kent must perform
Georgia's written instructions before he can communicate with her;
the instructions tell him to shop on Monday, but Kent has usually
shopped on Tuesday and is aware that Georgia frequently slips about
days of the week, naming one day, but subjectively intending another.

15 The instructions are not merely evidence of Georgia's mental state. Subordinates
often do not have a responsibility to do what a superior wants (if, for example, they think
an alternative is preferable) until they have been instructed to do so. Because Kent's
awareness of what Georgia wants is not the equivalent of his being instructed, the instruction has an independent significance. The instruction is "performative," see MAX BLACK,
MODELS AND METAPHORS 118 (1962), in that it alters Kent's responsibilities. Even if subordinates do have a responsibility to carry out unexpressed desires, their duty to do a particular act will have greater weight if it is the subject of an instruction.
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If Kent is confident that Georgia has slipped, he will probably try to
7
fulfill her subjective intentions 16 by shopping on Tuesday.'
Uncertainty about probable intentions raises a more interesting
conundrum. Suppose that Kent reasonably concludes that Georgia,
having written Monday, probably (55% likelihood) meant Tuesday,
but may (45% likelihood) have meant Monday. If Kent takes Georgia's immediate subjective intentions as his exclusive guide, he will
shop on Tuesday. Is that what he should do? Two related factors,
what we might call the responsibility to communicate effectively and
the psychology of review, come into play. The basic responsibility to
state the day correctly is Georgia's. When in genuine doubt, the recipient should perhaps take what Georgia says at face value. Further,
Georgia may subsequently review what Kent does. If Kent has acted in
accordance with what Georgia wanted, there should be no problem.
However, what if his action does not fit Georgia's mental state
purpose?
Suppose Kent explains to Georgia why he shopped on Tuesday,
although she actually wanted Monday, as she wrote. People often underestimate their incidence of mistakes, and are not fond of hearing
that they make lots of mistakes. Georgia may not appreciate Kent's
second-guessing her when she has expressed her wishes in clear language.' 8 Georgia may say, "Please do what I tell you, if that is dear,
unless you are sure I've misstated my purposes."
If, instead, Kent shops on Monday, although he thinks Georgia
probably wanted Tuesday, he can explain to her that he thought it best
to stick with what she actually wrote. Georgia will probably respond:
"The mistake was mine; I can understand why you went on Monday."
Given this second order of evaluation, a reasonable recipient might
well conclude that when the probabilities are close, he should do what
16
It is conceivable that a person will be so embarrassed by having a slip corrected that
it is better for the recipient to act as if there hadn't been a slip and carry out the person's
literal instructions, despite being sure a slip has occurred.
17
If we think of the reasonable listener as having all of Kent's knowledge about Georgia, he will reach the same conclusion as Kent. If the reasonable listener is restricted to all
past dealings of Georgia and Kent with respect to soupmeat, he may conclude that Monday
really means Monday. Another possibility is that the reasonable listener may have more
knowledge than Kent, perhaps because Kent has just started to work for Georgia (and the
reasonable listener is allowed information about Georgia's past behavior that Kent lacks)
or because Kent, being none too bright, has failed to draw inferences from Georgia's prior
slips that a reasonable person would make. When we turn to "meaning," these discrepancies raise puzzles. However, they are not of great importance for Kent's attempt to perform faithfully. Any actual recipient of instructions can only do the best he can with the
information he has (in addition to any further information quickly available at reasonable
"cost").
18 One may be inclined to say she has perfectly expressed her wishes, but she could
have forestalled the problem by adding: "Although we have usually shopped on Tuesday,
now I really mean Monday."
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is written, not what he thinks Georgia's immediate mental state intention probably was. 19
When Kent thinks that Georgia probably misstated her wishes, it
is possible that the best performance of his responsibilities as a servant
will not be the course that is the most prudent in terms of Georgia's
satisfaction (taking into account the likelihood of her satisfaction or
dissatisfaction and the intensity of her feelings). Because Kent and
Georgia have a common interest in continuing good relations, his taking the safer course of following her literal direction achieves some
overall benefit; but, if the instruction was very important, Kent might
think he would best serve Georgia by taking a course of action that
risked incurring her anger.
Reference to a speaker's broaderintent can partly account for the
complexities that possible slips introduce. Recognizing the principle
of speaker's responsibility, and her likely reaction to reasonable mistaken guesses, Georgia may want Kent and other servants to follow the
literal meaning of her expressed language, unless she has clearly
slipped. In that event, Georgia has an overarching intent that recipients of her instructions not always follow what they regard as her probable narrow intent. Kent may comply with her dominant intention by
deviating from his best estimate of the day of the week she had in
mind. In this manner, an approach claiming that faithful performance is always doing one's best to fulfill a superior's intentions might
address uncertainty about slips. But such an approach cannot deal
with the problem fully. Georgia's broader intentions will not reflect
everything that Kent legitimately takes into account. 20 Georgia may
not realize that she underestimates her slips, or is disturbed at having
possible slips "corrected." Her idea of a good approach to possible
slips may differ from responses that will actually lead to the best relations between her and Kent. Is the subordinate's job to fulfill the superior's intentions, no matter what? On subjects as complex as this,
subordinates are left with some independent judgment of what will
work best, if they think that differs from what a superior attempting to
state broad principles might say. 2 ' A speaker's intent approach does
not adequately address Kent's performance as a housekeeper in the
19 Or, the reasonable recipient might conclude that in conditions of substantial uncertainty about what the writer of instructions meant, he should use his best judgment,
treating the instructions as if they were incomplete or ambiguous, leaving him an implicit
choice between the two (or more) options. In this case, it would entail deciding between
Monday and Tuesday on the basis of other factors, such as which day has fresher meat.
The recipient may be more inclined to treat the instructions in this way, if he thinks that
the day he picks makes a substantial difference.
20
But see Moore, supra note 11, at 257 (suggesting that servants act according to their
perception of their masters' wants).
21 Indeed, this is one example of the subordinate not being bound to follow all unexpressed wishes of the superior.
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face of possible slips, even if Kent considers Georgia's intentions on
that subject.
More generally, the aspiration to follow instructions well is not
always reducible either to what the language signifies or to one's best
estimate of the speaker's intentions about the instruction. The sensitive subordinate will be guided by a subtle combination of these, and
perhaps other factors as well, in which estimates of probabilities will
figure.
My discussion of slips has introduced continuing relations between Georgia and Kent as a significant factor. I have already emphasized that continuing past relations between a superior and
subordinate will affect how a communication is understood. Such relations will also affect how specific the formulations of the superior
will be; less need be said when more can be assumed about past mutual understanding. The prospect of future relations can influence
what is the best performance of an instruction. Thus, two recipients
might conceivably reach exactly the same estimate of writer "slips" in
otherwise identical instructions; a recipient who is in a continuing relationship might best choose expressed language over likely intended
language, even though the recipient of an instruction in a one-time
encounter might best make the opposite choice.
2.

Meaning

What do instructions mean? Does meaning always coincide with
what we would regard as the best job of fulfilling the instructions?
Relatedly, should meaning be tied to a speaker's intentions, to a reasonable listener's understanding, to literal language, to some combination of these, or to something else?
When we consider straightforward, specific instructions, with no
"slips," that unambiguously require particular behavior, speaker's intent, reasonable listener appraisal, and literal expressed language fit
comfortably together, and the "meaning" of an instruction coheres
with the behavior that fulfills it. Thus, choosing between alternatives
appears pointless.
The alternatives begin to appear when there is an obvious slip,
such as "3:00 a.m." Faithful performance follows the intended, sensible time; that time is, both what the writer meant and what a reasonable reader would assume. But the literal language is different. 22 We
22
Professor Akeel Bilgrami has suggested to me that if I say "I am going towndown,"
the literal meaning obviously is "I am going downtown." (Conversation in winter, 19961997). Bilgrami's position seems undoubtedly right if the term actually expressed is meaningless and the intended meaningful term is evident. Matters become more debatable
when the term actually expressed does have a coherent meaning in that context. One
might wonder whether the "literal language" can demand something that is impossible.
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might say, "The instruction means 3:00 p.m., because that is what
Georgia wanted and what every reader would conclude." We might
say, "The instruction means 3:00 a.m., but Georgia meant 3:00 p.m."
If this stark choice makes us uncomfortable, we might equivocate,
"The language of the instruction means 3:00 a.m., but the writer obviously meant 3:00 p.m. and that is how a reader should understand the
instruction." When a slip is obvious, I prefer equivocation, since any
bare statement that the instruction means 3:00 p.m. or means 3:00
a.m. is misleading.
Analysis is further complicated when a slip is possible but not evident, as with the possible mistake of "Monday" for "Tuesday." Here
we are tempted to say, "The instruction means that Kent is to shop on
Monday." 23 That is certainly what the literal expressed language indicates; nothing in the language or standard circumstances (like ordinary shopping hours) suggests a slip, and a reasonable reader
unaware of Georgia's tendency to slip would conclude that Monday is
intended. If one takes this approach to meaning, there will sometimes be a wedge between the best performance of an instruction and
its meaning. The best performance might be on Tuesday, although
the instruction's meaning would designate Monday. If, on the other
hand, one says that the meaning of the instruction follows what Georgia specifically intended, and she actually happened to intend Tuesday, meaning might also not follow what would be the best
performance (according to the analysis that might give priority to the
literal language when the probability of a different intent is slightly
higher). If "meaning" followed best performance, the meaning would
encompass all the subtle calculations that would resolve what action is
best. Yet, it seems counterintuitive to think that the "meaning" of an
instruction shifts, depending on whether the issuer is likely to be upset by a wrong guess that his intent differs from his expressed language. In light of these various alternatives, an option which does not
try to attribute any single approach to the meaning of an instruction
offers considerable appeal.

However, a person could be instructed to fly, even if that is physically impossible, and a
person could be instructed to shop at 3:00 a.m., even if it happens that no stores are then

open. See Donald Davidson, A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs, in PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDS OF
157, 158 (Richard E. Grandy & Richard
Warner eds., 1986) ("The absurdity or inappropriateness of what the speaker would have
meant had his words been taken in the 'standard' way alerts the hearer to trickery or error;
the similarity in sound tips him off to the right interpretation").
23 See Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction
ofLegal Theory, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1, 14 n.72 (1993) (giving an example of someone who wants
chicken noodle soup but says, "I would like to order minestrone soup."). Paul Campos
takes issue with Patterson's assertion that actual intention is irrelevant to the meaning of
the statement. Paul F. Campos, This Is Not a Sentence 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 971, 980-81 (1995).
RATIONALTy. INTENTIONS, CATEGORIES, ENDS
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Instructions That Are Vague, Ambiguous, or Incomplete in
Context

We face further problems when (despite the absence of any
"slip") the application of instructions is uncertain in context. Because
Eskridge's story involves either clear applications or changed circumstances, 24 I shall return to the basketball illustration. The coach says,
"Don't shoot." In such circumstances, coaches and players realize that
a player might have a chance to take an extremely easy shot, but they
do not expect that to happen. The coach who says, "Don't shoot,"
might want to convey: (1) "Do not take any shots, however easy," or
(2) "Do not take any shots, except extremely easy shots that you make
almost every time."25 Or, the coach may neither have considered ex-

tremely easy shots nor resolved what a player able to take one should
do. We can illustrate these alternatives by imagining that a player had
asked the coach at the time, "Do you mean we shouldn't take even the
easiest lay-up under the basket?" The coach might have said (1) 'Yes,
don't take any shot"; (2) "No, if you are sure you can make an easy layup, go ahead"; or (3) "I wasn't thinking of those. Now that you have
raised that question, you should... [either (1) or (2)]." In the basketball illustration, no player did ask, and Cheryl has a chance to take
an unguarded shot she nearly always makes.
1. FaithfulPerformance
Cheryl must choose quickly. She might believe that she should
be guided by the coach's intent or that she should exercise her own
judgment, if the coach has not decisively foreclosed her from doing
so, or that she should act according to some mix of the coach's wishes
and herjudgment. One conceivable standard for Cheryl is what most
coaches would want if they said the same thing in similar circumstances, but she will certainly not take that standard as her final guide.
What most coaches would want might be evidence of what her coach
wants or of the best strategy, but it would not be directly determinative. Cheryl is interested in her coach and her own judgment.
Unless the coach has decisively foreclosed that choice, the question whether Cheryl should exercise her own judgment about strategy
is a difficult one that I will address in the next section. Here, I assume
that Cheryl thinks she should be guided by the coach's wishes in issu24 These include changed external conditions, new knowledge, and supplementary
instructions.
25 The coach's aspirations could be more complex. She might want the players to
focus exclusively on avoiding shots (and keeping the ball from the other team), and not
attempt to get into position for any easy shots; yet, she might also hope that if a player
fortuitously found herself in position for a very easy shot, she would have the good sense to
take it. In tense conditions, good coaches do not want to give players too much to think
about.
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ing the instructions, and she is sure that the coach had definite wishes
about easy shots. Cheryl will bring to bear all the relevant knowledge
she has about the coach's wishes (insofar as she can do that in one
second) to decide what to do. The reason I assume Cheryl's guide is
her coach's wishes (to the exclusion of her own judgment about what
is really most desirable) is not because that is usually the right attitude
for subordinates acting under instructions. Rather, the objective is to
clarify analysis by an initial focus on a recipient of instructions who is
single-minded in this way.
Cheryl's best efforts to fulfill the instruction would be straightforward, were it not for a complication we have already surveyed-the
26
consequences of a mistaken choice if the probabilities seem close.
People who are knowledgeable about basketball would understand
that the coach's instruction does not clearly settle the question of very
easy shots; but the literal language of the instruction fits better with
Cheryl's declining the shot than taking it. If she declines the shot, she
can explain to the coach that she was trying to do what the coach said.
The coach's anger may be less if Cheryl does that, despite the coach's
wish that Cheryl take very easy shots, than if Cheryl shoots, despite the
coach's wish that she not take any shot.2 7 If Cheryl values continuing

good relations with the coach and regards the probabilities as close,
she may regard it as desirable not to take the shot, even though she
thinks it is slightly more probable than not that the coach wishes her
to shoot.
2.

Meaning

If we assume that Cheryl's practical task reduces to trying to carry
out the coach's wishes, how should we conceive the meaning of the
instruction itself? I shall mention six possibilities. The meaning of
the instruction might be (1) according to its literal language, (2) according to general use, (3) according to the coach's intentions, (4)
according to a reasonable person's understanding, (5) according to
the most perceptive person's understanding, or (6) not dispositive for
the choice Cheryl faces.
A quick examination reveals that alternatives (1), (2), and (6)
leave a large gap between Cheryl's efforts to perform faithfully and
what one would say about meaning. I shall begin by examining these
alternatives.
It is tempting to associate meaning with literal meaning. If the
coach says "don't shoot," doesn't that mean "don't shoot, period," cov26 The analysis here is closely similar to that of Georgia's possible slip.
27 Here it is hard to say which response is riskier; a coach may say, "Of course I didn't
mean you should pass up an easy lay-up."
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ering all possible shots? 28 The problem with this approach is that, in

ordinary discourse, it is very common to prescribe without qualification. The parent who tells a child "go to your room and stay there for
fifteen minutes," does not want the child to remain in the room if a
bear has pushed in the window. It is awkward to say that the instrucions mean that one should not behave in a way-for example, leaving
the room if a bear enters-that anyone would want and expect. If
"literal meaning" requires taking words and phrases without implicit
qualifications or ellipsis, it often deviates from ordinary meaning or
29
generally understood meaning.
A defender of the literal meaning approach might retreat to this
position: "Literal meaning is not the meaning when that would obviously be inapt; but in cases of doubt we should understand meaning as
literal meaning." One problem with this position is that it equates
"meaning" with the literal meaning of the expressed language whenever literal meaning is one possible construction, even though the
speaker did not so intend his instruction and no listener would understand it that way. There is no neat place to draw the line at which the
most likely understanding (if it is nonliteral) should yield to literal
meaning. That is, if literal meaning is not the meaning when that
would obviously be inapt, there is no sensible way to say how certain the
bad fit must be between literal meaning and intended, understood
meaning for literal meaning to be displaced as the meaning.
The second possibility is that meaning would be according to
general use and understanding of this sort of utterance. "Meaning"
would then not cover circumstances in which no one would expect or
want the prescription to be followed. This position has greater attraction, because it allows for a more natural rendering of what remarks
mean. But, this position faces what we can call "the pressure towards
specific context."
If one asks about general use and understanding, how is one to
describe what count as similar situations? As a starter, one will limit
the focus to "don't shoot," spoken by coaches at the final stages of
basketball games when the coaches' teams are ahead. To someone
who understands basketball, two variables now become critical. One
28 For a defense of this basic approach, see SCHAUER, supra note 1.
29 See the discussion of restricted quantifiers in Proceedings,supra note 13, at 825-99.
Saying what words mean literally is often hard. A typical strategy for the defensive team in
the basketball situation I have described is to foul, forcing the team with the ball to shoot
foul shots. Cheryl's coach certainly does not mean that the team should not shoot its
awarded foul shots (though many years ago, that was an option). Does the literalmeaning
of "don't shoot" cover foul shots or only field goal attempts? I'd say the implicit limitation
to field goals is so self-evident, that the literal meaning covers only them. One attempt to
draw the line between general background assumptions that figure in literal meaning and
matters of particular context that do not is found in JOHN R. SEARLE, ExPRESSION AND
MEANING: STUDxES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACrs

(1979).
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is the skill level of the team. If a coach were dealing with a young,
inexperienced team, she would probably want to convey the message
that players should take no shots at all. However, a professional coach
would realize that her players are much more certain to make "easy
shots," and that the players' judgments about which shots are easy are
much more trustworthy. That coach would probably not mean to forbid extremely easy shots.
A second variable concerns score. For a team that is five points
ahead with twenty-four seconds to go, another two points will help
considerably, and will not leave the team vulnerable to a quick tie.
But suppose the coach's team is only one point ahead? It happens
that easy shots count for two points, and some longer shots count for
three points. The opponents may be ready to give up even a certain
two points in order to have the chance to score three. A coach who
says, "don't shoot," with a one point lead, is more likely to want no
shots taken.
In summary, giving any general answer to what those words are
likely to communicate from coaches to players about very easy shots
may be impossible. If one tries to narrow the question to teams of
similar abilities involved in games with comparable situations regarding score, why not focus on a particular coach and her team? As with
any plausible reliance on literal meaning, we come up against an arbitrary line. How does one delimit matters of context that can figure in
a general inquiry from matters of particular context that are
excluded?30
As noted earlier, the sixth possibility is that the meaning simply
does not resolve whether Cheryl should regard herself as free to
shoot. That approach would provide little help for Cheryl, who is
seeking guidance from the coach's instruction. Perhaps one would
nevertheless reach this conclusion if the considerations on each side
seemed totally indecisive. But if the instruction seems, on balance, to
exclude easy shots or to allow them, one would strongly hesitate to say
that its meaning simply doesn't bear on the problem at hand.
Perhaps the other three possibilities are more promising. At the
very least, each connects much more closely to the practical choice
that Cheryl must make. The simplest approach, number (3), would
3
be to say that meaning depends on the speaker's actual intent. '
Under this approach, all anyone can do is to estimate or guess about
the meaning of instructions. People often infer the intentions of
others with a high degree of reliability, but they do not have direct
30
See generally William D. Popkin, Law and Linguistics: Is There Common Ground?, 73
WAsrH. U. L.Q. 1043 (1995) (questioning the amount of context needed to. determine
meaning).
31
See, e.g., Campos, supra note 23, at 982.
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access to someone else's mind; they must rely on the person's speech
and other behavior. Even when the coach says after the fact what she
meant, that does not give complete certainty. She may be lying, having a lapse of memory, or shading the truth in subtle ways she may not
recognize. A coach who did not advert to very easy shots when instructing her players, may well say after an easy shot is missed, "I told
you not to shoot!"
Is the idea that meaning depends completely on actual intent
troubling or even incoherent? Some people believe so, and suggest
that Wittgenstein's comments about the impossibility of private language support the idea that meaning cannot depend on (ultimately)
undiscoverable mental states. 32 This argument is unconvincing. In
our simple case, the coach had one of two mental states, each of
which is comprehensible and fits her language moderately well. The
intent was publicly discoverable, even if it had not been confidently
discovered. The only difficulty is knowing, or assessing, which of the
two mental states the coach had. There is no incoherence in making
meaning depend on that; it is analogous to asserting that something
may be a matter of historical fact, even though we lack a solid basis for
determining it. Still, it is a bit disconcerting to suppose that the meaning of an instruction depends on something that is not only arguable,
but is a matter of fact beyond certain determination. It is yet more
troublesome to conclude that the real meaning (according to actual
intent) might fail to correspond with a reasonable, or the best possible, assessment of what the instruction conveys.
Each of our other alternatives focuses on a listener's assessment
of what the coach meant to convey. We might say that the meaning of
the instruction tracks what a reasonable listener (number 4) or the
most perceptive listener (number 5) would decide about the coach's
intent. Insofar as meaning depends on the use of language in context,
a highly perceptive listener may grasp more of the relevant background than an ordinary reasonable listener, allowing him to gauge
the speaker's wishes more accurately.3 3 Plainly, the more perceptive
listener should respond in accord with his superior insight. Now, it
32

See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085, 1088

(1995).
33 If we ask about the significance of language itself, detached from the special circumstances in which it is used, the relation of an ordinary and highly perceptive listener
looks somewhat different. What much or all language means, depends on general use (or
general expert use in a field). With many simple terms taken by themselves, there may be
no "most perceptive observer," unless it is someone who has studied the uses of others.
Ordinary understandings determine meaning. However, with complicated instructions (as
in I.R.S. regulations) and even sentences of ordinary complexity, a gifted reader may be
better than a common reader ai sorting out the implications of the language. See Robert S.
Summers & Geoffrey Marshall, The Argument from Ordinary Meaning in Statutory Interpretation, 43 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 213, 220-24 (1992).

1014

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:994

would be possible to say that "meaning" is determined by ordinary
reasonable listeners, and that the more receptive listener properly acts
contrary to the instruction's meaning (but in accord with his superior
insight about intent), or properly acts in accord with a special meaning; but these circumlocutions are confusing. If faithful performance
depends on an assessment of the intent of the speaker, then, subject
to a qualification I will mention, it makes sense to tie meaning to the
best possible human assessment of that intent.
How should we conceive the best possible assessment of the
coach's intent?3 4 From what perspective is the assessment to be made,
at what time, and with what available information? Although one
might adopt the perspective of an outsider who is familiar with the
situation, it is preferable to ask what a recipient of the instruction
might understand. Because the communication is from the coach to
the players, the relevant assessment should be one which a player
could conceivably make.3 5 This has consequences for both content of
information and time.
The assessment could employ the speaker's own explanations.
An explanation given at the time of the instruction, probably counts
as part of the instruction. If the coach follows, "don't shoot," with "I
mean any shot," that amounts to "don't take any kind of shot." An
explanation between the instruction and the player's decision how to
act would similarly count as part of the instruction.3 6 Information
that some outsider (say, the coach's husband) has that is not accessible to players should not count for what the instruction means.
If one limits information about an instruction to what is accessible to the recipients, the relevant information for any recipient must
probably be what is available up to the time of choice. It follows that
an instruction that extends through time could mean one thing for
one recipient and another for a recipient who fulfills the instruction
later (with additional available information, but without change in
surrounding circumstances).37 At any time prior to the recipient's de34

It will, of course, not do to say that the best assessment is usually made inside the

speaker's mind. Allowing that to count as the best assessment brings us extremely close to
saying that actual intent determines meaning. For the assessment approach to be different, we must imagine the perspective of an outsider who does not have omniscient access
to the internal workings of the speaker's mind.
35
From this standpoint, it may matter whether the recipients of the instructions are
competent adults or children (though one might say the most perceptive child, say a tenyear old, could perceive what a very perceptive adult could perceive). More generally, this
problem raises the question of whether one thinks in terms of very perceptive real people,
or superperceptive people, who are more perceptive than any actual human beings.
36
Cheryl will not care if the coach clarifies her wishes in the original time-out or a
subsequent time-out. I assume the explanation reliably reflects the coach's original wishes.
An unreliableand inaccurateexplanation may supplement and alter the original instruction.
37
Indeed, if a single actor had to act on the instruction more than once, the instruction could have different meaning for him at different times.
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cision, the instruction would "mean" whatever accords with the best
assessment of intent possible at that time. Thus, the best assessment
approach incorporates the possibility of changes of meaning as new
information becomes available-most particularly, reliable explana38
tions by the speaker of what she meant.

If we focus exclusively on circumstances in which the recipient's
practical task is to follow the speaker's intent and not to make her
own judgment about desirable action, conceiving meaning as directly
tied to a speaker's intent is simpler than conceptualizing meaning in
terms of the assessment of recipients. (We might, however, still
choose the option of recipient understanding if it is much better for
other situations, and we aspire to a uniform approach to meaning.)
Each of these approaches ties the meaning of an instruction fairly
closely to what would be the best performance of an instruction. Both
of these approaches to meaning, however, fail to account for an aspect
of situations of uncertainty, namely, that the wisest performance may
be to act upon the less probable of two intentions, if the language of a
formulation makes acting on the other possible intention a riskier
course of action.39 The answer to "what an instruction (probably)
means," may not be the same as the answer to "what is the best performance for a recipient under the instruction."
C. Instructions to a Group That Must Coordinate Immediately
The question of whether, in order to discern meaning, one
should focus on reasonable listeners, rather than on the most perceptive listeners or on the speaker's actual intent, looks different if the
communication requires immediate coordinationwithout discussion, or
if review is the crucial stage. For these situations, an ordinary, reasonable apprehension may be critical. The very perceptive listener cannot expect others to see all that he does; he will realize that
coordination will take place on the basis of what others understand.
And when someone's (an ordinary person's) actions are reviewed, it
may make more sense to conceive meaning according to what an ordinary person could grasp, rather than in line with what someone of
extraordinary insight might understand. These possibilities suggest
that, other things being equal, the meaning of instructions could depend on whether immediate coordination is essential, or whether one
38 A further development of reasons behind the instruction, though not focused on
the particular problem the actor faces, could have a similar effect.

39 I refer here to the risk of generating a more hostile response if one guesses wrong.
I have already mentioned that one could try to accommodate this risk under a speaker's
intent approach, but that the accommodation is not fully satisfactory. One might conceive
"meaning" as tracking the efforts of the perceptive listener to take this into account. In
that event, we would have the odd conclusion that meaning could vary from what the
perceptive listener (uncertainly) thinks the speaker tried to convey.
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is at the review stage. The specter of such variations suggest further
that the meaning of "meaning" may depend on practical considerations and may vary even as to the same instructions.
I will comment briefly on the coordination issue. Instructions are
given to a group, and its members must act together before seeking
further clarification or discussing the instructions among themselves.
Suppose at a vital point in our basketball game, one play seems very
likely to succeed. The new coach shouts a number for a less promising play, a number that is close to that for the better play. Only
Cheryl, who has played for this coach before, is aware that the coach
makes "play number" mistakes in stressful situations. Cheryl is sure
the coach wants the "better" play. But knowing that everyone else will
follow the announced play, Cheryl should do the same. 40 Even if
Cheryl's degree of certainty that the coach has slipped is so great that
it would definitely have led Kent to follow his sense of Georgia's
mental intent in preference to her literal language, Cheryl should be
41
guided by the literal language.

This problem affects the issue of whether we want to conceive
meaning as tracking what the most astute observer would understand,
rather than what the ordinary observer would understand. If meaning
matches the ideal performance of instructions, this example may suggest that meaning for coordinated-group instructions follows the understanding of most members of the group. 42 Of course, if the most
astute observer takes into account the need for coordinated action,
she may interpret the instructions accordingly, thus bringing her final
judgment into line with that of ordinary recipients. If meaning is so
understood, the meaning of otherwise similar instructions could depend on the number of listeners and their relationships to each other,
on the nature of the task to be performed, and on the overall institutional system in which the instruction is embedded. Coordination, of

40

1 assume the team has taken all of its "time-outs," so stopping the game for clarifica-

tion is not an option.
41
One might speak of the coach's overriding intent that everyone perform the same
play, which here, in application, conflicts with her intent that the "logical" play be
performed.
42
A further perplexity appears if ten players realize that the eleventh will misinterpret
in a particular way, and therefore act in a way that fits his probable actions. In that event,
we would certainly not say that the instruction's "meaning" is in line with the eleventh
player's misunderstanding, nor would we even say that the best performance follows his
misunderstanding. Rather, we would say that the players departed from the terms of the
instruction to achieve the overarching aim of coordinated action. (We might run this conclusion backwards to say that the superior listener departs from the instructions whenever
he tailors his behavior to ordinary understanding, but that large extension of our conclusion about one player's misunderstanding seems unwarranted.).
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course, is crucial for legal systems, but in a way that differs from my
example. 43

The review stage, also of vast importance for the law, introduces
similar complexities to the understanding of instructions. Even if the
recipient should be guided by actual intent (or the most perceptive
assessment of that, which amounts in practice to the same effort),
someone who assesses whether the recipient's performance was satisfactory or not will give overarching significance to how a reasonable
person would have interpreted the instructions. If "meaning" connects closely to faithful performance, "meaning" may shift from recipient choice to review.
A different approach to these complexities is to seek one steady
account of "meaning," and to say that the differences in the best way
to carry out instructions, and differences between performance and
review, introduce elements beyond meaning. Another possible approach is one that is mixed. Meaning would be somewhat, but not
entirely, responsive to what is the best performance.
Neither general usage nor philosophical clarity dictates one of
these approaches. Each form of conceptualization can yield adequate
understanding, so long as we recognize that the best understanding of
instructions depends on variable factors related to situations. We
need to recognize that "the meaning of an instruction" is ambiguous
and may be answered in different ways. Anyone who talks about such
meaning in a theoretical way should make clear just how he is using
the term. It may be that some particular approach to "meaning" will
work best for practical affairs, or practical affairs of a certain kind; but
the case for any such approach will depend on sustained and complex
argument.
D.

Changing Conditions

I turn now to situations in which the circumstances have changed
from the time the instructions were issued. In our main example, the
first changed condition is that Store X has burned down.
1. FaithfulPerformance
Kent is now forced to go to a different store. If the nonexistence
of Store Xis the only change in conditions, and Store Yis similar in all
43 The legal instructions contained in statutes lie someplace between the directive to
an individual and the one to a group that must instantly coordinate its actions. These
instructions affect many people, and there is no realistic opportunity to seek quick clarification. However, someone who is confident that words are not meant literally usually has
an opportunity to explain why to others. Moreover, different responses to a statute ordinarily are not self-defeating in the way that it is self-defeating for players to carry out different
plays.
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important respects to Store X, we do not doubt that Kent is as faithful
as he can be to Georgia's instruction when he buys the meat at Store
Y. One may be faithful to an instruction without adhering to every
detail, if adhering to every detail is impossible.
Exactly how to describe the situation is not quite so simple. The
concern is whether we should say that Kent continues to perform Georgia's instruction, or whether we should use some weaker phrase, such
as Kent carries out the spirit or purpose of Georgia's instruction, or
Kent carries out what Georgia's instruction would be, given the
change. Many terms carry their own flexibility and invite minor deviations. If Georgia said, "Shop at 5:30," she would not usually mean that
shopping at 5:29 is too early or 5:31 is too late. Suppose Kent shops
somewhat later than 5:30 (say 5:50) because a household crisis precludes leaving earlier. At least if the precise time is not a central element, I would say he is still performing the instruction. 44
How would we regard Kent's choice to go to Store IP? Georgia
has specified three major elements, and one cannot be performed according to her terms. The choice of Store Ymay be obvious. It may
be like Store X and in much closer geographical proximity than other
similar stores. If Georgia had previously suggested to Kent that he go
to Store Y when Store X was closed for a holiday, we might even say
that her instruction implicitly told Kent to use Store Y if Store X was
unavailable. If Georgia had never thought about Store Y, we might
say, "Choosing Store Y best fulfilled Georgia's instruction," or "Kent
best carried out his instructions by going to Store Y."
If Store Z is a reasonable alternative to Store Y, where should
Kent shop? Let us suppose that Kent is reasonably sure that Georgia
prefers Store Y, but Kent believes Store Z is better. His assessment is
this: Store Y is a much more pleasant place to shop, and that gives
Georgia confidence in the quality of its meat; but the meat is actually
better at Store Z. How relevant is Kent's judgment? For Kent, this
depends on at least four variables: the specificity of Georgia's expressions; Kent's confidence in his judgment as compared with Georgia's;
Kent's and Georgia's understandings about comparative competence;
and Kent's belief about the degree of difference in light of Georgia's
fundamental aims.
Kent is clear that Georgia has the authority to pick whatever store
she wants. Georgia has chosen Store X Suppose on past occasions,
Georgia had always told Kent to go to Store Y rather than Store Z
when Store X was closed. Kent might reach one of two conclusions
about this. First, he might decide that "Shop at Store X' is a kind of
shorthand for the ordering Georgia prefers. In other words, Kent as44

Others who have discussed this problem with me disagree.
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sumes that Georgia had her preference for Store Y in mind, and
meant for Kent to adhere to that preference; that Georgia believed
her communication would be so understood by him; that she formulated it to produce that understanding; and that she expects him to
realize that she has done so. In that event, the force of the instruction
itself is almost as strong in favor of Store Yover Store Z, as it is in favor
of Store X
Second, Kent might decide, instead, that Georgia had not
thought about any stores other than Store X when she gave the instruction. Still, on past occasions, she had expressed to him a preference for Store Y over Store Z and he knows that nothing has altered
that preference. Because Georgia has authority over him, her past
expressions, plainly relevant to this situation, carry great weight. Nevertheless, if Kent goes to Store Z, he will be able to say, "I didn't disobey you because you didn't tell me which store to use if Store Xwas
closed."
Are matters different if Georgia had never indicated a preference
for Store Y or Store Z? In ordinary circumstances, Kent will be much
less sure what Georgia would want if she had not addressed the point.
However, he may well enough understand her reasons for preferring
Store Xto be virtually certain that she would prefer Store Yto Store Z,
and perhaps she had silently preferred Store Y Still, she has not explicitly said so, now or previously. He is not disobeying her by going
to Store Z, he is only failing to carry out her unexpressed or hypothetical wishes. 45 This example shows, among other things, that for ordinary instructions, wishes the speaker has implicitly expressed in the
instruction usually carry more weight than previously expressed wishes
that are not implicitly included, and expressed wishes of any sort usually carry more weight than similar unexpressed or hypothetical
wishes.
Why would Kent do anything other than Georgia's actual or hypothetical wish? Georgia is interested in the quality of meat; she draws
an inference about that from a store's appearance. Kent thinks Store
Z has better meat, so he disagrees with Georgia about which store better satisfies Georgia's own objectives. The more confident Kent is that
he is right, the more he will be inclined to do what he thinks best. He
will also be influenced by the degree of difference he perceives. On
trivial matters, he may aim only to carry out Georgia's immediate
45 An unexpressed wish is a preference felt by Georgia, but not conveyed to Kent. A
hypothetical wish is one that would be felt if Georgia had addressed the circumstance. If
Georgia had never expressed a wish to anyone, Kent will often not know whether he is
guessing about her unexpressed or hypothetical feelings. However, because I am treating
expressions to third parties not intended to be conveyed to Kent as (relevantly) unexpressed, Kent may find out about feelings not expressed to him.

1020

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:994

wishes; if he perceives a substantial difference, he will have a stronger
reason to follow his own judgment (though this may be counterbalanced if he thinks Georgia perceives a substantial difference in the
other direction).
One critical factor does not depend on either person's opinion
alone. Imagine two kinds of relations of authority. In one such relation, both the person with authority and the subordinate recognize
that the former not only has a right to dictate what will happen, but is
also undoubtedly more competent than the subordinate. The
subordinate does the task because the person in authority lacks the
time or inclination to do it. I experienced such relations firsthand
when I worked one summer on clay tennis courts under the supervision of a professional, and one weekend when I did some menial tasks
in a greenhouse owned by the family of a close friend. In neither
instance did I have any basis to trust my opinion instead of the judgment of the person instructing me. We both understood this.
In other contexts, both parties realize that the subordinate is
more of an expert in most respects, although the person in authority
may make crucial choices if she wishes. In the old days, wealthy parents may have regarded tutors and governesses like this; many modern
suburbanites so regard people that care for the grounds around their
homes. A housekeeper might well fall into this category and might be
viewed as an expert in many respects. Yet another possibility is that
subordinates and those in authority regard themselves as about
46
equally expert.
These understandings affect expectations about instructions.
The more the subordinate is recognized as "the expert," the more he
is regarded as free to exercise his own judgment, so long as the choice
is not foreclosed by specific instructions to the contrary. In our example, if Georgia and Kent regard choice of store as usually within Kent's
domain, Kent would give relatively little weight to his assumption
about Georgia's unexpressed or hypothetical preference if she had
never expressed a preference for Store X or Store Y Even a past expression by Georgia of a preference for Store Ywill not seem controlling if both understand that Kent has discretion to choose the store
unless Georgia directs otherwise.
The problem of relations of authority is not limited to choices in
situations of fundamentally changed conditions; it reaches many
other circumstances as well. It arises when a situation comes up that

46 Needless to say, in-between possibilities are infinite. The subordinate may have
more or less expertise than his superior, with both having considerable competence (or
incompetence); or, there may be significant variations in subdomains.
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the speaker may not have foreseen when giving the instructions,4 7 and
when the speaker used language that is vague, ambiguous, or incomplete for the situation at hand.
Thus far, I have assumed that the speaker and listener have a
common view about relations of authority. In that event, if the two
also share other understandings about the instructions, they will agree
on how much latitude the instructions leave to the judgment of the
listener-subordinate. But speaker and listener may not agree on the
subordinate's precise role. If their disagreement is radical and obvious, conflict will ensue and their relations are 'likely to be severed.
However, subtle, modest disagreements about role can survive for a
very long time. When these do exist, the subordinate's sense of how
he best performs under the terms of an instruction may be different
from the superior's.,
One might suppose that disagreements about role reduce to a
misunderstanding by the subordinate of the superior's conception of
proper relations. If instructions come ,from God, this supposition
would hold true. Human beings should exercise the degree of judgment that God intends. One may think that some purely human relations are similar, that everything is finally up to the superior. But if
one conceives of doctors, lawyers, nannies, actors, dancers, and
others, one cannot generalize that conclusion. Part of the
subordinate's idea of role may include a sense that even on matters as
to which he must follow specific directives, he may use his own judgment in the absence of a specific directive that clearly applies. He
may think that the client or director may not alter the general range
of discretion by a vague instruction, "Do whatever you think I probably want, even if I do not clearly say so."
A further complexity about some relations of authority concerns
what we may call "independent objectives.' Either the speaker or the
recipient has objectives that are not shared by the other, and are
outside the range of purposes for which the relations of authority exist. Store Z, unknown to Georgia, is owned by a cousin of Kent's.
Kent would like to help his cousin by shopping there, but he realizes
that Georgia would not regard such help as a reason for him to spend
her money there. In a more complex example suggested orally at the
Symposium by Deborah DeMott, Cheryl, standing under the basket,
realizes that if she scores two more points in her final college game,
she will break a scoring record and be able to command a higher
47 That category may cover the very easy shot under the basket. It covers the question
of whether to stick to literal terms if those can be satisfied, but the result is highly unpalatable; for example, whether in Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889), the grandson who
murdered his grandfather should inherit under the grandfather's will according to the
simple statutory rule.
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professional salary. 48 Thus, she has a reason to shoot that does not
relate to efforts to win the game. Conversely, as Stephen Garvey
points out, the person giving the instruction may be motivated by considerations that are outside the range of objectives he could reasonably expect his subordinates to accept.4 9 To take a stark example
suggested at the Symposium, the coach in our basketball game may be
aware that a close friend has bet on the opposing team with a point
spread of five points. The optimal outcome for the coach may then
become to win by less than five points.
When the objective of the subordinate is wholly inappropriate, we
can simply say that it should not affect how he understands instructions. When the authority's objective is similarly inappropriate, subordinates may be justified in disobeying instructions. The complexities
arise when the unshared objectives fall within an acceptable range.
Georgia may not mind if Kent directs some business to relatives if the
household does not suffer. The presence of an accepted independent
objective might tip the balance of how instructions would be performed. Perhaps if Kent considered only Georgia's instructions and
objectives, he would interpret the instructions as directing him to
shop at Store Y if Store X has burned down. But, given the lack of
specificity of the instructions and his independent objective, he does
not take the instructions as foreclosing a choice to shop at Store Z.
We notice here a point obliquely illustrated by the example of a
possible slip. The best performance of the instructions from the point
of view of the shared objectives of the speaker and listener may not
necessarily be best in terms of all the (acceptable) objectives of the
listener. As Robert Cooter pointed out in the Symposium, one might
ask what is best overall, as well as what is best for Georgia or best for
Kent. 50 One way to conceive the general welfare is as a possible set of
acceptable objectives that either the speaker or listener may not share.
Perhaps Kent wants to use Store Z to help its poor, hard-working
owner, but Georgia is indifferent to the economic hardship of others.
One final point remains to be made about relations of authority.
It is easy to conceive of an authority's expressed or probable opinion
as lying at either of two poles: either the opinion is "advisory," not
binding the subordinate who is free to use his own judgment, or it is
48 Videotape of the Cornell Law Review Symposium, The Nature and Sources, Formaland
Informal, of Law (Mar. 1-2, 1997) [hereinafter Videotape] (on file with the Cornell Law
Review).
49 Stephen P. Garvey, Are Housekeepers Like Judges?, 82 CORNELL L. Ray. 1039, 104142
(1997) (discussing the "Not-Entirely Faithful Head-of-Household"). One may suppose that
people in Georgia's circumstances can pursue whatever objectives they want, short of
harming their children. But often, people in authority have their own roles circumscribed
by a limited range of purposes.
50 See Videotape, supra note 48.
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what Joseph Raz has called "exclusionary,"5 1 purporting to supplant
the subordinate's own judgment. But we need to recognize that between the poles is an entire spectrum. 52 On matters that it covers, the
opinion may carry weight, having independent force on its own, but
leaving some room forjudgment. The subordinate may disregard the
opinion if, in his judgment, the countervailing reasons are extremely
strong, but he should follow it, if he thinks the balance of reasons is
only moderately on the other side. This reduces to: "Give some
weight to the opinions of the authority just because those are her
opinions."
2.

Meaning

How does one speak of the "meaning" of an instruction in light of
changed circumstances? This is a bit awkward, even when Kent's obvious responsibility in our example is to go to Store Y after Store X has
burned down. If Georgia had previously indicated that Kent should
go to Store Y if Store X was unavailable, we might understand the
original instruction implicitly to include Store Yas the desired alternative if Store X is not aviilable. 53 We could then conclude that the
instruction's meaning covers Store Yand has not changed. It continues to be, "Buy meat at Store X or if Store X is not available, at Store
Y." Only the proper fulfillment of the instruction will have shifted.
Suppose we cannot make out any indication from Georgia that
Kent should shop at Store Yunder the circumstances. In that event,
the original instruction did not implicitly include a preference for
Store Y We might reason that most instructions implicitly include a
direction to carry out the project as well as possible if compliance with
the original terms is no longer feasible. In that event, perhaps this
instruction implicitly included a direction to choose an alternative
store if necessary, and envisioned or authorized the choice of Store Y
But the idea of an implicit direction to choose Store Yseems artificial
if neither Georgia nor Kent had in mind any alternative when she
spoke, and if previous communications between them did not establish Store Y as the preferred back-up to Store X
We might, then, better say that the meaning of the instruction,
which continues in force, has changed in the sense that an addition
has been made. We can still understand the instruction to direct
shopping at Store X if it is open, but we now take the instruction to
51 Raz, supra note 1, at 39.
52 Frederick Schauer emphasizes this point and responds directly to Raz in SCHAUER,
supra note 1, at 88-93.
53 This understanding of the instruction is possible only if we focus on Georgia and
Kent, or upon a reasonable listener who knows enough about past relations between Georgia and Kent to add this to the words Georgia has spoken.
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include the possibility of going to Store Y if Store X is unavailable.
This conceptualization requires us to conceive of Kent as having the
power or authority to change the meaning of the instruction, in order
to carry it out as best he can when performance according to the origi54
nal terms of the instruction has become impossible.
Variations in which Store Z is a reasonable alternative to Store Y,
and in which role conceptions are crucial, present a much greater
difficulty for "meaning." Suppose that Georgia has in the past expressed to Kent a preference for Store Y over Store Z, but both Georgia and Kent understand that Kent can choose the store for shopping
unless explicitly directed otherwise. In that event, the instructions
definitely do not implicitly direct him to use Store Y if Store X is unavailable. Nor do they implicitly direct him to use Store Z. Perhaps
they implicitly direct him to use his bestjudgment if Store Xis unavailable; but even that is doubtful. Very likely, Georgia would not mind if
he went to Store Y (her preference); and Kent is aware of that. Perhaps we should say that the meaning of the instructions has changed
to allow shopping at another store, leaving Kent free to adhere to
Georgia's preferences or to use his own judgment about the best
store.
Role conceptions that leave Kent latitude to disregard some of
Georgia's preferences raise even deeper problems about meaning,
ones that may be sharpest when two people disagree about their respective roles. A crucial question Kent must ask himself is whether
Georgia has successfully circumscribed his latitude of choice. We
know that Georgia cannot do so merely by wishing Kent to do something-even if Kent happens to guess her wishes. She can only do so
by expressing a direction that Kent do something. Georgia has directed Kent, but has she limited his choice? On this question, Kent will
not concede that Georgia has successfully circumscribed his choice
simply because she wished and intended to do so by her utterance. 55
He may conclude that the instruction implicitly includes his going to
Store Y, but that he may disregard this aspect of the instruction. Or
he may conclude that if her utterance did not adequately convey the
limitation to him, he is not circumscribed at all. Kent will not take
54 Notice that, under this conceptualization, Kent can add meaning to the instruction
of which Georgia may be unaware. An approach that makes a speaker's intent, or a perceptive listener's understanding of the speaker's intent, crucial would require some emen-

dation to incorporate this. The suggestion of William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Judith N. Levi
that some legal phrases or terms be understood as "regulatory variables" is one way to
accommodate this notion of changing "meaning" for altered circumstances. Wrlliam N.
Eskridge, Jr. &Judith N. Levi, On Regulatory Variables: Regulatory Variables and Statutory Interpretation, 73 WASH. U.. L.Q. 1103 (1995); Proceedings, supra note 13, at 841-43, 945-52.
55 For example, Kent might find out indirectly what Georgia aimed to do with her
communication to him, and still conclude that she had failed.
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Georgia's probable intentions as his exclusive guide for understanding her utterance, especially if he has acceptable independent objectives. What she directly communicated to Kent, the listener, in words
he would understand, may be his guide.
If the idea that speaker's intent might determine meaning was
attractive when we looked at it previously, 56 that was largely because

we assumed that the listener was trying to act upon that intent. Once
we drop that assumption, speaker's intent seems less crucial. The listener's apprehension of what is conveyed seems equally important.
But this creates yet another barrier to talking about "the meaning" of
the instruction. Suppose Georgia and Kent take opposing views as to
whether she constrained Kent's choice of store. There may be no basis to privilege intent over Kent's understanding, and there is no evident way to "average" the idiosyncrasies of the two in order to arrive at
a "real" meaning. Rather, if we are going to talk about "the meaning"
as something different from what either Georgia or Kent may conclude, we are pushed toward some idea of how most people (or a reasonable or perceptive person, situated like Kent) would understand
what Georgia said. Once speaker and listener perspectives are given
equal significance, the move toward some sort of objective meaning is
a natural one.
A further complication concerns how we should describe disagreements about role that yield different understandings of how far
listeners should be constrained by an instruction. If two players have
precisely the same view about what the coach intended and wanted
when she said, "Don't shoot," and the players further agree on what
the phrase means in some more general sense, they still may disagree
about what they should do, because they differ about the coach's authority. One may regard herself as constrained, the other not. Similarly, a player and coach might disagree, as Georgia and Kent might
disagree, when the only ground of difference concerns the
subordinate's underlying role. If "meaning" were conceived as following assessment of how the instruction should be taken, these disagreements would be about meaning. This is certainly one possible
conceptualization. 57 But we might instead say, "Because Kent perfectly understands Georgia's state of mind and the general meaning
of the terms she uses, he and Georgia do not disagree about the
'meaning' of the instruction; they disagree only about how far he
should carry out her previously expressed wishes or probable desires."
This comparison re-emphasizes a point made earlier-that the phrase,
56 See supra Part II.B.2.
57 This is similar to how "realists" understand the meaning of natural, moral, and
theory-laden terms, with "meaning" in accord with scientific reality or ideal choice. See,
e.g., Michael S. Moore, A NaturalLaw Theory oflnterpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277 (1985).
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"the meaning of an instruction," may reasonably be keyed more or
less closely to the question of its appropriate fulfillment in the
circumstances.
Our discussion of possible "independent objectives" has revealed
yet another difficulty with tying meaning closely to faithful performance. If we can imagine that the performance that is "best" may vary
depending on whether we take all the objectives of the speaker, or all
the objectives of the listener, or some other standard, we may conclude that we cannot speak of a "best performance" without further
explication. We could obviously not arrive at a single meaning tied to
performance until we settled on what "best performance" counted.
Perhaps appropriate objectives that are mutually accepted 58 would be
the best guide, if one were to try to settle on one standard of best
performance that would determine meaning, but I shall not work out
that complication here.
E.

Supplementary Directives

Professor Eskridge suggested another variation on the original
scenario. In it, Georgia, worried about the effect of cholesterol on her
children's health, instructs Kent to buy foods that an article says are
low in cholesterol. 59
1. Faithful Performance
The precise impact of Georgia's new instruction on her soupmeat
instruction is somewhat complex. Kent could continue to buy
soupmeat and buy the articles Georgia now wants. The significance of
the new instruction lies not in its terms, but in its underlying reason.
If soupmeat has a lot of cholesterol and Georgia doesn't want her
children getting too much cholesterol, that is a reason not to buy
soupmeat.
Two barriers exist to Kent's concluding that he should cease buying soupmeat. First, Georgia has not said that he should stop; she
could have included that in her new instruction. Maybe her failure to
mention anything of the sort shows that she wants her initial instruction to continue. Kent gathers, instead, that she did not mention
soupmeat because she was not aware just how much cholesterol (beef)
soupmeat contains, or perhaps because, in focusing on good things
for the children to eat, she failed to review whether any staples in their
diet posed a serious risk. If Kent is an agent with a substantial compe58
For this purpose, one should probably count objectives as to which one person
(say, the speaker) is indifferent, but accepts as guiding the other to some extent. For
example, Georgia might accept Kent's shopping at his relative's store, if she has not directed otherwise.
59 See Proceedings, supra note 13, at 941.

1997]

FROM THE BOTTOM UP

1027

tence of his own, he properly matches his own reliable informationthat beef soupmeat is high in cholesterol-with Georgia's expressed
preference against cholesterol for the children.
But that judgment alone is not sufficient for him to stop buying
soupmeat. Soup made with soupmeat may have substantial nutritional value that offsets the danger of cholesterol. Kent can feel confident he is doing what Georgia really wants, or what she would want if
she had his reliable information, only if he assures himself that his
proposed substitute will not sacrifice the values of soup made with
soupmeat. If he assures himself that chicken soup does have roughly
the same value and he concludes that Georgia's failure to mention
soupmeat in her instruction does not reflect a wish that he continue
buying soupmeat despite its high cholesterol content, then he will perceive his switch to buying chicken as not at odds with the aims of
Georgia's initial instruction.
2.

Meaning

Just how should we conceptualize Kent's purchase of chicken
at Store ? Here, a good bit turns on the word
meat for soup
"soupmeat.''60 If Georgia and Kent have taken the word literally as
meaning any meat for soup, then chicken qualifies as meat under that
interpretation. Because Georgia originally wanted Kent to buy beef
and Kent understood and accepted this, the original instruction implicitly included a preference for beef. Kent continues to buy meat
for soup, the meat he is confident Georgia would prefer if she knew
the facts about the cholesterol content of beef. Because his job is
largely to carry out Georgia's most recently expressed wishes, he now
buys the soupmeat that does so. His interpretation of how to perform
the first directive is colored by the reasons for the later directive. We
might say that one of the implicit understandings concerning the first
directive has been canceled. Following this view, the meaning of the
first instruction has changed if we include implicit understandings,
61
but otherwise it has not changed.
The initial instruction looks different if we suppose that
"soupmeat" has always meant, and continues to mean, "beef meat" for
soup. We can put this alternative most starkly if we assume that Georgia originally instructed Kent to buy beef for soup. In any literal or
ordinary sense, chicken is not beef. We would hesitate to say that buying chicken is "complying with" or "carrying out" Georgia's instruction to buy beef. The "meaning" of that instruction does not include
buying chicken for the soup. We might rather say, "Kent is doing the
60 See id- at 943.
61 Alternatively, one might speak of the second directive as trumping an aspect of the
first directive, whose meaning remains constant.
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best he can to follow the spirit of Georgia's instruction, in light of the
facts of which Georgia (the danger of cholesterol) and Kent (the high
cholesterol content of beef) have now become aware." Kent is not
disobeying Georgia's initial instruction, because Kent is assuming that
the changed conditions eliminate its force in one particular. However, Kent is not complying with the original directive either. Nor is
Kent's purchase of chicken based on an interpretation of the original
directive (taken by itself); although his action is based on an interpretation of all relevant directives (or, perhaps more precisely, on an interpretation of the import of all relevant directives). If Georgia and
Kent assume that all instructions that continue in force are to be interpreted in light of all later instructions and their reasons, 62 then we
might say Kent is interpreting the original directive (though self-consciously disregarding one of its terms) and is complying with it. According to this view, if interpretation is equated with discerning
meaning, 6 3 then the meaning of an instruction will shift as later instructions are forthcoming.
Why have I regarded the shift from beef to chicken (assuming
that soupmeat has always meant beef) as different from the shift from
Store X to Store Y? Kent cannot shop at Store X if it has burned
down. We can think of the original instruction as implicitly including
(or at least not excluding) use of an alternative store if Store X is unavailable. Here, beef remains available, and many people continue to
buy it for soup. Kent buys chicken instead of the available beef. Georgia meant beef and Kent understood that. Thus, it is harder to say
that Kent is complying with the original instruction alone when he
switches from beef to chicken than when he uses Store y64
Can we say that Kent is complying with the more abstract idea of
purchasing the best meat for soup, and with the abstract idea that
Georgia's instructions should be interpreted to fit together?65 Perhaps, but Georgia's instructions were specific, not abstract. However,
this comparison tends to show that there is no sharp line between
62 People might also want instructions to be interpreted in light of earlier instructions, or earlier instructions that evidently remain in force.
63 Perhaps a more plausible view is that the inquiry about meaning is narrower than
all relevant steps in interpretation. (Or, if interpretation is taken narrowly, that interpretation is to discern meaning, but that other steps need be taken to decide how to apply
instructions.).
64 As this Article makes evident, the answer to the question of whether the recipient is
complying with" an instruction is close to, but not identical with, a judgment of whether
his action is covered by the meaning of the instruction. (I have suggested implicitly that
one might comply with an instruction even though its meaning does not cover one's
behavior.).
65 See generally David 0. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation,andJudicialReview, 17
PHIL. & PUB. AFr. 105, 121-29 (1988) (discussing the role of abstract intent in determining
meaning and purpose).
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when Kent complies with the original instruction though he no longer
fulfills each of its specific terms, and when Kent no longer complies
with the instruction itself, though he fulfills its broad spirit. 66 There is
also no sharp line between appropriate responses to changed conditions that rest on "an interpretation" of a directive, and those that
amount to a 'justified departure" from the terms of the directive. We
can imagine clear instances at either end of the spectrum-the difficulties lie in the middle.
I have so far considered the possibilities that the term "soupmeat"
includes chicken or definitely excludes chicken. Matters might be less
clear. The word "soupmeat" does not literally exclude chicken. Suppose, because of tastes, beliefs about health, and prices, it has long
been thought that the most desirable meat for soup is beef, and that
"soupmeat" has come loosely to mean "beef." Of course, people do
occasionally buy chicken and other meats for soup, but general usage
has not included meats other than beef as "soupmeat." New information has made beef seem much less desirable. Over time, the shifting
sense of desirability may shift the understanding of the term
"soupmeat." If "soupmeat" has meant something like "the best meat
for soup" (and that has happened to be beef), the term may quickly
become more vague as to the specific meat to which it refers. Kent's
purchase of chicken could, in part, be conceived as a kind of proposal
that chicken should now count as "soupmeat." On this account, Kent
makes a new interpretation of the meaning of Georgia's original directive, one he thinks she will endorse, and he sees himself as complying with the directive as so interpreted.
F.

Radically Changed Conditions

The next changed circumstance in our example is the rationing
system. If all meat is very expensive, it may be best not to buy meat.
Kent does not take Georgia's directive about the soupmeat as foreclosing that choice. He properly buys other items of food. How are we to
conceptualize that choice?
We can no longer talk of Kent carrying out Georgia's first directive. The meaning of that directive does not cover what he now does.
Might we say, as we could with the purchase of chicken, that Kent is
fulfilling the spirit of the directive, if not its terms? Yes and no. Kent's
behavior is in accord with the spirit of the directive-to buy healthy
food for children. But Kent would take it for granted that Georgia
66 An intermediate example would be if Store Xremains open, but has changed management and deteriorated. Shopping at Store X is not impossible-in that respect the
example resembles the beef-chicken problem. However, Store X has changed and is no
longer the same Store XGeorgia meant-in that respect the example resembles the buming down of Store X
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wants him to buy healthy food for her children. 6 7 When he bought
chicken, he was still regularly buying meat for soup; it is quite possible
that absent the directive, he would rarely have given the children soup
with meat in it. Georgia's directive still had a significant bearing on
his choice. That is no longer true. Had she never uttered a word
68
about soupmeat, he would still be buying the same non-meat items.
The significance of the directive now is as a possible obstacle to
choice, an obstacle that Kent reasonably disregards. Although it is not
inaccurate to say that Kent still acts in the spirit of the directive, it is
more illuminating to conceive the directive as losing force because of
changed conditions than to suppose Kent is somehow still carrying it
out.
This situation further reinforces how blurry the line is between
the carrying out of a directive in changed circumstances and the loss
of a directive's force in changed circumstances. 69 Similarly blurry is
the line between interpretation of the spirit of the directive and disregard of the instruction. If the aim of the directive had been something less obvious than healthy food for children, its rationale could
continue to influence choice, even if none of its specific terms were
followed. Indeed, this could be the situation here if the first directive
continued to influence Kent to buy ingredients for soup. Then, we
could not speak simply of the directive as losing force.
G. Lapse of Time and the Comparative Force of Judgments
Eskridge's story contemplates a substantial lapse of time during
which Georgia is neither with her children nor communicating with
Kent about the circumstances of their lives. 70 We might imagine an
earlier era when parents went to India, leaving their children with a
housekeeper and other staff. In the most extreme and painful version, the parent dies after leaving instructions relating to the children.
Let us suppose that the subordinate continues to believe he should
follow instructions directly on point for conditions that have not significantly changed. But as time goes by and as the parent is further
removed, the housekeeper will rely more and more on his own appraisals. We have already seen one reason for this development.
When it becomes impossible or evidently unwise to continue doing
67 Parents might have objectives that are not nearly so obvious. For these, a directive
might continue to exercise influence, although performance of its main terms is no longer
feasible.
68 Here, I disregard the possibility that the directive leads him to continue to buy

items for soup.
69 Some directives may lose force permanently, because the conditions they envision
will never re-emerge. The soupmeat directive loses force only temporarily. When rationing ends, Kent should go back to buying chicken for soup.
70 See Proceedings, supra note 13, at 941.
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what the specific directives indicate, the housekeeper will need to exercise his own judgment to carry out the broad objectives that are reflected in the specific instructions. In theory, he might do this by
continuing to give overarching weight to what he thought the parent
would want in the circumstances.
But two much more subtle changes also operate. For many matters (although perhaps not diet), parents re-shift objectives for children as they interact with them and see them grow. Only in the
broadest sense of "wanting what is best for them" do most parents
maintain consistent objectives for children over time. An optimistic
assessment would be that parents learn more about what is good for
their children as they learn more about their children. If Georgia is
away for a long time, she is not on hand to do the learning; Kent is on
the scene. Not only will his estimates about what Georgia would want
become more unreliable, he will have increasing confidence in his
own views, and declining confidence in Georgia's expressed or probable views. He might conceive a construct of what Georgia would
want if she had been around and learned what he has about the children. But, his assessments of her actual mental state wishes at an earlier time, or her probable wishes in the present (given her actual
assumptions about the children), will carry less weight than they once
did.
A related change will commonly occur. If Georgia is away for a
long time, those who are present are likely to see raising the children
as more and more their responsibility and less and less Georgia's.
Similarly, people in Georgia's position are likely to feel that they have
less right to dictate to those closer at hand; and sometimes the
strength of their parental feeling dilutes with time. These patterns
reinforce the tendency of the present housekeeper to give increasing
weight to his judgment, and for that to be accepted by an absent
parent.
These comments further illuminate the question of role. Someone in Kent's position will not have a standard conception of role that
rigidly applies to all superiors. His notion of role will shift subtly as
parents absent themselves, or return to involve themselves more
71
closely with their children.
H.

Abstract and Specific Purposes

With most directives, we can identify specific as well as more abstract objectives. Typically, one could talk about a range of objectives,
going from the most specific to the most abstract. In our example, to
what extent does the faithful housekeeper pay attention to abstract
71

Georgia may undergo parallel changes in attitude.
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rather than specific objectives? Roughly, we can think of directives
formulated at very specific, middle-range, and highly-abstract levels.
The soupmeat directive is very specific. Georgia made it specific
because she expected it to be carried out in a precise way, and she had
authority to do that. So long as conditions (and knowledge) do not
change, Kent should do what Georgia has specifically requested. Even
then, his behavior will also be restrained by implicit specific understandings and general objectives; for example, he will not buy meat
that has spoiled. Abstract objectives will also inform him how to take
the directive in changed circumstances and will signal when the directive's force has lapsed.
As the terms of the directive become more abstract, anaiysis becomes more complicated. Suppose Georgia tells Kent to buy meat
that is "reasonably priced." We can imagine two extremes. One is
that Georgia doesn't wish to waste money, but she leaves it to Kent to
decide what is "reasonable," and Kent understands this. The other
extreme is that Georgia has often shopped with Kent and she has let
him know exactly what she considers to be unreasonable pricing.
Both she and Kent may understand that "reasonably priced" is a shorthand for the specific prices for particular cuts of meat that Georgia
thinks are reasonable. Until conditions change, Kent need not exercise his own judgment. As prices in general rise, he will have to exercise some judgment, but perhaps little more than if Georgia had set
out an exact list of acceptable prices in the first place. (I say little
more, because if Georgia had set out the list, that might have reflected
less confidence in Kent's judgments about rising prices than if she
used the term "reasonably priced.")
Typically, Georgia and Kent understand an instruction about
"reasonably priced" not to embody either extreme. Kent is to be
guided substantially by Georgia's opinions about reasonable prices, insofar as these have been clearly expressed to him. However, because
Georgia's expressed opinions don't cover every contingency, Kent is
also expected to exercise some judgment. This (probably) does not
mean that Georgia's opinions are merely guides that Kent is free to
reject. If Kent thinks a particular meat is so good it is worth paying
twice the price Georgia has said is reasonable, Kent is not free to buy
it, telling Georgia that he exercised his own bestjudgment about what
was reasonable.
Of course, these matters are relation-specific and context-specific.
Suppose Georgia and Kent both recognize that Kent knows much
more about meat prices than Georgia. Georgia was once very rich,
and often instructed Kent to buy the best meat available, regardless of
price. After suffering big losses in the stock market, Georgia has decided to economize. She tells Kent to buy meat that is "reasonably
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priced." Although she has expressed opinions to Kent about reasonable pricing, she has always followed such comments with the remarks,
"Of course, you know best here. I trust your sense of when better
quality warrants a higher price." In these circumstances, Kent may
take Georgia's opinions as only that, regarding himself as free to
judge on his own, so long as he avoids wild extravagance. And, as I
have mentioned, Georgia and Kent may understand that her opinions
carry independent weight, even if they are not exclusionary.
Among these various alternatives, how would we decide what
"reasonably priced" means in a directive from Georgia to Kent? Unless Kent's task is to follow Georgia's wishes (even if not clearly expressed), there is no reason to privilege her sense of what "reasonably
priced" entails for him over his own. 72 Does "meaning" include their
past relations, as ,they bear on what this phrase means for them, or is
meaning to be assessed according to some general understanding, in
which event it is vague in context?7 3 I am inclined to say, if one resolution is necessary, that the meaning here depends on what a reasonable understanding of the term would be for this directive, on the part
of someone aware of previous exchanges between Georgia and Kent.
CONCLUSION

What general lessons may be drawn from this examination of performance and meaning of informal instructions, and what relevance
do these conclusions have for law?
I have focused on what can go wrong with authoritative informal
instructions; situations when the speaker may have made a mistake, or
the instructions do not dearly cover the action that should be taken,
or conditions have changed, calling for different behavior from what
the instructor envisioned. These situations raise questions about faithful performance and about what the instructions "mean."
A central issue about performance is to what extent the person
subject to the instructions should do what the person who gives the
instructions wants; how far he should follow the apparent import of
the language of the instructions (if this diverges from likely intent);
and how far he should use his own judgment. We have seen that
when someone tries to follow informal instructions, the mental state
intent of the person who gave them is very important, but it is often
not the only guide to judgment. If an easy transposition to law were
72 I am talking here about how the phrase "reasonably priced" is to be understood if it
is not clear, not about specific choices that Kent makes (which, of course, would be relatively unconstrained under one understanding of "reasonably priced").
73 That is, the phrase is vague not only about what prices are reasonable, but about
the range of choice envisioned.
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possible, we might suppose that this subjective intent would matter
greatly, but would often not be the only guide to action.
One thing about which we can be sure is that no easy transposition from informal contexts to law is possible, as the brief comments
at the beginning of the Article indicate. Our law contains very different kinds of norms. A common law rule is not the same as a disposition prescribed by an individual's will, and a rule that indicates how
much of one's marginal income one must pay in federal income taxes
is not the same as the highly general "compelling interest test" in constitutional law. No one has ever suggested that interpreting common
law rules comes down ultimately to discerning some individual's or
group's subjective intent; we should be surprised to learn that intent
plays as great a role there as it does for informal instructions. Yet,
some applicable legal rules seem at first glance not so different from
instructions. These are the wills of individuals and orders or rules issued by single individuals who have the authority to dictate (within
limits) what is legally proper behavior by their subordinates. Conceivably, a full theory about our system's legal norms would conclude that
actual subjective intent plays no role in determining performance,
even for wills and individual orders; but that conclusion would, at the
very least, be counterintuitive. Because of the difficulties of the concept of intent for multi-member bodies, because the officials who apply statutes must typically concern themselves with how the statutes
are understood by other people subject to them, and because of the
length of time between statutes and performance, the claim that subjective intent should not be central in constitutional and statutory interpretation seems more immediately appealing. In this respect, I
74
think the commentary of Stephen Garvey is tremendously helpful.
By complicating my examples in ways that bring them closer to many
legal problems, he shows how difficult it may be to fix on any intent
that should be controlling. 75
My Article indicates a point that is obvious upon slight reflection.
The problem about how to determine relevant subjective intent exists
not only when that intent is the governing standard for action, but also
when that intent is one relevant criterion for what should be done.
All the complexities I have explored about how to determine the intent that counts, as well as some additional problems, will be present if
we conclude that subjective intent matters for performance in law.
In informal contexts, how the recipient thinks he can best perform instructions will depend partly on his sense of role, and that
sense may vary from how the issuer of the instructions sees the respective responsibilities of authority and subordinate. Perceptions of role
74
75

Garvey, supra note 49.
Id. passim.
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may shift as time lapses from when the instruction is given. As conditions change and fulfillment of the literal terms of the instruction becomes impossible or unwise, exactly what the subordinate should do
may shift. The opinion of the person giving an instruction may be
more than "advisory" and less than "exclusionary." Although we can
talk of "carrying out the instructions but not each detail," of "carrying
out the spirit of the instructions but not its terms," and of "the instructions losing force," the lines between these categories are not precise
at the edges. These aspects of our analysis undoubtedly have some
relevance for understanding legal interpretation; but how they apply
may differ widely among branches of law and varieties of legal norms.
I have made five central points about the meaning of instructions: (1) In the absence of some overall theoretical structure that
would yield more rigorous conclusions than reflective intuitions, we
have no straightforward conception of meaning that applies comfortably in all instances; (2) What amounts to literal meaning is often debatable, because the degree of contextualization is far from selfevident; (3) Ordinary understanding of instructions depends significandy on context, and particularly on shared assumptions of speaker
and listener. As Neil MacCormick pointed out in the Symposium, we
might think of the "locutionary" meaning of instructions (the behavior to which they refer) as depending in part on their "illocutionary"
force (their function);76 (4) Meaning does not seem always to follow
best performance, though one could, of course, stipulate that it does;
and (5) The meaning of an instruction will, on many accounts,
change depending on the context of decision that is involved. The
meaning, for example, may be different for someone who carries out
instructions than for someone who reviews her performance.
We know that the subject of meaning in law will be no simpler
than it has been for our discussion. This lesson may already have
been obvious from writings about literary interpretation and related
fields; but part of the rationale of my exercise is that informal instructions are in most ways more like law than are works of art. For this
reason, what this study shows us about the perplexities of meaning for
imperative language, and about the way meaning may diverge from
best performance, has particularly pointed relevance for law.
A possible strategy to deal with these difficulties is to adopt some
relatively simple approach to meaning and say that all else that performers of instructions and courts take into consideration is "application" or something else, not an inquiry about meaning. 77 Although
this strategy might produce a clarified sense of meaning, it faces, for
76

See Videotape, supra note 48.
See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Nature of Rules and the Meaning of Meaning,72 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1449, 1461-76 (1997) (summarizing Schauer's claim that rule application
77
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law, the difficulty that people usually talk of the whole enterprise of
interpretation as discerning or elaborating the meaning of the legal
norm involved. Another strategy is to acknowledge that "meaning"
has many meanings; that a choice of one standard for what counts as
"the meaning" comes down to a question of what will lead to desirable
practical choices.
A final caution is warranted. I have continually talked about instances that raise problems. As I have noted, the performance and
meaning of instructions are often straightforward in context, leaving
no important choice to the person who wishes to fulfill the instructions. Unless we find otherwise, we should assume the same may be
true of law, that there will be many instances in which appropriate
performance and meaning (though perhaps not the precise criteria
for determining meaning) will be clear and congruent.

differs from rule comprehension, and exploring whether that conceptualization makes a
practical difference).
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APPENDiX
ON DEPARTING AND FAILNG TO COMPLY

Choosing the precise language when someone does not follow
instructions is difficult. Here, I explore certain possibilities in more
detail than in the main text. The issue is how one would describe an
action in relation to the instructions. As we have seen, a subordinate
may follow a directive, though he no longer fulfills each particular of
it. I am assuming here that the deviation between the subordinate's
action and the language of the directive is great enough so that he is
definitely not following the directive.
If S, the subordinate, correctly believes that faithfully taking the
directive as a guide would require him to do one thing and he does
something quite different, he is disobeying the directive. 78 (He may
or may not believe he has a moral justification.) If he correctly*perceives that his action is at odds with the directive, it does not matter
whether his conclusion on this score is reasonable, or is unreasonable
but fortuitously right.
If S correctly believes that not following the directive is warranted
in light of the directive itself and its underlying objectives (this was the
situation when Kent stopped buying meat under the rationing sys79
tem), then S has justifiably departed from the directive.
Suppose the actual circumstances warranted not following the directive, but S failed to perceive any circumstances of that sort. Here
the characterization is more difficult.. S thought he was disobeyingthat is, he thought he lacked a warrant to deviate in the way that he
did. But the warrant was there. We might say: "S intended to disobey,
but the circumstances were such that he only departed," or "S disobeyed, although grounds unknown to him existed for his departure."
I am inclined to favor the first alternative because I don't think one
usually disobeys (in ordinary usage) unless he fails to do what is called
for.8 0 Yet, I might tell a child that she disobeyed me if she meant to
do so, but had misunderstood my instructions. In context, "disobey"
can take either an objective or subjective twist. Still, in this context,
the objective twist seems preferable.
78 1 assume that the force of the directive is strong enough so that one would speak of
disobedience. One might not speak of disobeying directives with very weak force.
79 If he unreasonably concluded that he should not follow the directive but was fortuitously correct, he was objectively justified in departing from the directive (the circumstances gave rise to ajustified action of that sort), but he was subjectively unjustified (no
reasons he accurately perceived warranted a departure).
80 Suppose S thought he was disobeying, but he actually carried out the instructions
to the letter. We would probably not say then that he disobeyed. The same should be true
if he has engaged in an objectively justified departure.
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This leaves us with the situation in which S believes he has a good
reason not to be guided by the directive; but S is wrong. He should be
guided by the directive. Disobeying is not the right term, because that
term imparts a conscious refusal that is lacking here. Departure is
also not quite right, because that term suggests that not following the
directive was warranted. 81 Perhaps the best phrase is something like
8 2
"S failed to carry out" or "failed to comply."
This discussion reveals just how difficult it is to come up with an
apt characterization, how arguable the most apt characterization may
be, and how subtle shifts in circumstances can alter that.

81
Or, it may leave open the question of whether the departure was warranted.
82 If S's conclusion was reasonable, we might say that he "innocently" or "justifiably"
(in light of information available to him) failed to comply. If his conclusion was not reasonable, we could say that he "mistakenly" failed to comply.

